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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial recall threatens to abolish the independence of the
judiciary.1 These constitutional provisions set a dangerous precedent
and will have an adverse effect on merciful sentencing in criminal cases.2
In California, such a case exemplified these trepidations and ignited a
fierce debate. 3 In 2017, a petition circulated in Santa Clara County for
the recall of Judge Aaron Persky, a presiding judge for the past thirteen
years, regarding his grossly lenient, albeit lawful, sentencing in the
sexual assault case involving ex-Stanford swimmer Brock Turner.4 The
recall was placed on the June 2018 ballot, where Judge Persky was
subsequently recalled.5
First, this Note will trace the historical development of judicial
recall, along with other mechanisms for policing the judiciary. Second,
this Note will identify the problem in California’s Constitution: that
permitting citizens to recall judges will allow political pressure to
influence judges’ sentencing decisions, thereby, abolishing the
independence of California’s judiciary. Third, this Note will explore
why the current mechanisms for policing judges are adequate, as
supported by empirical studies, thus demonstrating why judicial recall is
unnecessary and its debilitating effects on an independent judiciary, the
poor, and people of color. Finally, to preserve judicial independence in
California, this Note proposes a solution and lays out a model
amendment eliminating judges from being subject to recall, by
barrowing underlying logic from states that do not provide judicial
recall.
The goal of this Note is to emphasize why state constitutions
permitting judicial recall will abolish the independence of the judiciary
and set a dangerous precedent for criminal sentencing. Additionally, the
Note utilizes the California case People v. Turner,6 where Judge Aaron
Persky administered the sentencing decision, as a focal point for
highlighting these issues.

1. LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, Why the Recall of Judge Persky is Terrible for Racial
Justice, JUDGECORDELL.COM, http://judgecordell.com (Sept. 23, 2017).
2. Id.
3. Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/06/05/617071359/voters-aredeciding-whether-to-recall-aaron-persky-judge-who-sentenced-brock-tur (Nov. 4, 2018).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Sentencing Memorandum, People v. Turner (No. B1577162).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Direct Democracy
The Progressive Era saw the emergence of direct democracy as a
mechanism for American citizens to directly participate in the political
process.7 The Progressive movement’s general theme was to “restore a
type of economic individualism and political democracy that was widely
believed to have existed earlier in America and to have been destroyed
by corporations and the corrupt party machines.”8 The Progressives
were committed to transforming America’s social, economic, and
political climate.9 In sum, they sought to use direct democracy as a
means “to remedy the socioeconomic and cultural ills” afflicting the
country during this era.10
To achieve social reform, the Progressives felt they needed a new
political system, separate from the one they inherited.11 All Progressives
recognized the initiative, referendum, and recall as means toward
“removing the corrupting influences which straightjacketed the political
system into acquiescence to the social afflictions accompanying
industrialization.”12
Direct democracy only applies in states that have chosen to adopt it
as part of the state constitution.13 “The initiative is a process that enables
citizens to bypass their state legislature by placing proposed statutes and,
in some states, constitutional amendments on the ballot” for
amendment.14 The referendum “allows the public to vote on laws passed
by the legislature before they become effective.”15 The recall is a
procedure that allows citizens to remove and replace local and public
officials before the end of their term of office.16 The United States
Constitution does not provide for recall of any federally elected

7. Nathanial A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. & POL’Y REV.
11, 18 (1997).
8. Id.
9. Persily, supra note 7, at 22.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id.
12. Persily, supra note 7, at 24.
13. See generally Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES
(Sept.
20,
2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx.
14. Id.
15. Rebecca White Berch, Megan K. Scanlon & Jared L Sutton, The Centennial of
Arizona’s Constitution: Celebrating the Centennial: A Century of Arizona Supreme Court
Constitutional Interpretation, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 468, 488 (2012).
16. Initiative, Referendum and Recall, supra note 13.
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official.17 Unlike the recall, which is a political device, impeachment is
the legal process of removing an elected official from office.18 Further,
impeachment distinguishes itself from recall, because it generally
requires that a government official commit a named crime.19
Seeing direct democracy as a threat to corporate interests, Pacific
States Telephone and Telegraph Company challenged the
constitutionality of the initiative process itself, and eventually argued it
before the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging that it violated the “Guarantee
Clause”20 of the U.S. Constitution.21 The Court “rejected the company’s
argument and reemphasized the history of precedent, declaring the
Guarantee Clause to be a non-justiciable political question to be
answered only by the political branches.”22 Thus, the decision erased
any doubt as to whether direct democracy was constitutional.23
Although direct democracy is constitutional, these same democratic
devises that originated as tools for the majority to uproot corporate
interests have now evolved into mechanisms used by similar
corporations and interest groups to attain their interests.24 Corporations
and interest groups quickly learned to use direct democracy to their
advantage.25
In recent years, “liberals, conservatives, politicians, and citizens”
have utilized the ballot to enact proposals they believe are being
insufficiently addressed through the legislative process, and to resolve
highly publicized political issues.26 This use of direct democracy has
created an initiative industry for collecting signatures, promoting
measures, and attaining interests.27 Additionally, direct democracy has
manifested itself as a means for politicians and interest groups to
manipulate the political process by permitting them to frame political

17. Tom Murse, Can You Recall a Member of Congress?, THOUGHT CO. (May 3, 2017),
https://www.thoughtco.com/can-members-of-congress-be-recalled-3368240.
18. Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 8, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx.
19. Persily, supra note 7, at 14.
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and
on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic violence.”).
21. Persily, supra note 7, at 32 (citing Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Or., 223 U.S. 118
(1912)).
22. Id. at 32 (citing Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 142-43).
23. Id. at 32.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 37.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Persily, supra note 7, at 38.
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issues.28 However, California recall is unique, in that it provides its
citizens with broad power to recall officials.29
B. History and Process of California Recall
Under the California Constitution, the Legislature possesses the
power to provide recall of local officials.30 Using this power, the
Legislature drafted the recall provision, which grants citizens the power
to remove state and local officials.31
The citizens of California adopted the recall provision as part of the
California Constitution in 1911.32 State trial court judges, unlike federal
court judges, judges of the state court of appeal, and state Supreme Court
justices, are listed as local officials and are subject to recall under local
official standards enumerated within the California Constitution.33 The
standards required to initiate the recall of a local official are considerably
lesser than those required to recall a state official.34 The California
constitution does not require specified grounds to recall a local official.35
Although the recall of judges has been a rare event, California had
previously recalled three superior court judges in 1932.36 Most recently,
California recalled Governor Gray Davis in 2003.37
The California Constitution prescribes the requirements for recall
of local officials.38 The recall process consists of a two-step petition and
voting process: (1) the citizen recommending the action circulates a
petition to obtain enough signatures to place the issue on the ballot, and
28. Id.
29. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“Recall is the power of the electors to remove an elective
officer.”).
30. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 19 (“The Legislature shall provide for recall of local officers.
This section does not affect counties and cities whose charters provide for recall.”).
31. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13.
32. California Constitution Center, What Does California’s Experience With Recall of
Judges Teach Us?, SCOCA BLOG (Nov. 10, 2016), http://scocablog.com/what-doescalifornias-experience-with-recall-of-judges-teach-us/#_ftn27.
33. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b) (“A petition to recall a statewide officer must be signed
by electors equal in number to 12 percent of the last vote for the office, with signatures from
each of 5 counties equal in number to 1 percent of the last vote for the office in the county.
Signatures to recall Senators, members of the Assembly, members of the Board of
Equalization, and judges of courts of appeal and trial courts must equal in number 20 percent
of the last vote for the office.”).
34. Id.
35. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a) (“Recall of a state officer is initiated by delivering to the
Secretary of State a petition alleging reason for recall. Sufficiency of reason is not reviewable.
Proponents have 160 days to file signed petitions.”).
36. California Constitution Center, supra note 32, at n.27 (citing Wilbank J. Roche,
Judicial Discipline in California: A Critical Re-Evaluation, 10 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 192 (1976))
(discussing 1932 recall of Los Angeles Superior Court judges John L. Fleming, Dailey S.
Stafford, and Walter Guerin).
37. California Constitution Center, supra note 32.
38. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14 subsections (a) through (c) lay out this framework.
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(2) if sufficient signatures are collected and certified (in California the
sufficient amount being twenty percent of the last vote for the office39),
the issue is placed on the ballot for a vote.40 If the citizens vote in favor
to recall the official, the official will be removed from office before the
end of his or her term and a replacement official (the candidate listed on
the ballot who received the most votes) will fill the position.41
C. Mechanisms to Police Judges in California
California currently possesses three mechanisms to police judges:
the Commission on Judicial Performance,42 impeachment,43 and recall.44
Additionally, because trial court judges are elected officials, it could be
said that a fourth mechanism for policing exists in the form of retention
elections.45 These elections are held every six years and allow voters to
decide whether to re-elect a judge for another term in office.46
1. Commission on Judicial Performance
The Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) was established by
legislative constitutional amendment approved by voters in 1960.47 The
CJP is an “independent state agency responsible for investigating
complaints of judicial misconduct, judicial incapacity, and for
disciplining judges, pursuant to the California Constitution.”48
The CJP consists of one judge of a court of appeal and two superior
court judges.49 It also consists of two members of the state bar of
California who have practiced in the state for ten years, and six citizens
who are not judges, retired judges, or members of the state bar.50 Finally,
CJP members are eligible to serve a maximum of two four-year terms or
a total of ten years, if appointed to fill a vacancy.51
39. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b).
40. Berch, Scanlon & Sutton, supra note 15, at 488.
41. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15(c) (“If the majority vote on the question is to recall, the
officer is removed and, if there is a candidate, the candidate who receives a plurality is the
successor. The officer may not be a candidate, nor shall there be any candidacy for an office
filled pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 16 of Article VI.”).
42. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
43. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18.
44. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14.
45. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
46. Id. Subsection (c) reads terms of judges of superior courts are six years beginning the
Monday after January 1 following their election.
47. Commission
on
Judicial
Performance,
C.A.
GOV’T,
https://cjp.ca.gov/legal_authority/.
48. Commission on Judicial Performance, C.A. GOV’T, https://cjp.ca.gov. See also CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 18; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18.1; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18.5.
49. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8(a).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Pursuant to the California Constitution, the CJP has the authority to
make rules for the investigation and formal proceedings against judges.52
These rules are referred to as the Rules of the Commission on Judicial
Performance. 53 In relevant part, one provision of the Rules of the CJP
sets out the standard of review and standards for removal pertaining to
legal error:
[d]iscipline . . . shall not be imposed for mere legal error without
more. However, a judge who commits legal error in which, in
addition, clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith, bias, abuse of
authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of
the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial
duty is subject to investigation and discipline.54

Additionally, the California Constitution grants the California
Supreme Court the power to make rules for the conduct of judges, both
on and off the bench, referred to as the Code of Judicial Ethics.55 This
code serves as an ethical guideline, to which judges must abide.56 It also
serves as a tool for the CJP to use during its investigation, along with
other laws.57 Finally, after concluding an investigation, the CJP may
submit a petition and recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of a judge.58 Upon submission, the Supreme Court reviews
investigation and recommendation, and determines whether the judge
will be removed.59
2. California Impeachment
As mentioned above, impeachment is a legal process.60 The
California Constitution authorizes the power to impeach solely within
the Assembly.61 The Senate tries impeachment trials.62 Judges of state
courts are subject to impeachment for misconduct in office.63 Judgment
may extend only to removal from office and disqualification to hold any

52. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18. See also Commission on Judicial Performance, supra note
47.
53. Rules of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, https://cjp.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/40/2017/08/CJP_Rules.pdf.
54. Id.
55. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(m).
56. Id.
57. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18.
58. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(d).
59. Id. However, if the Supreme Court has not acted within 120 days after granting the
petition, the decision of the commission shall be final.
60. Recall of State Officials, supra note 18.
61. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a).
62. Id.
63. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 18(b).
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office under the State, however, the person convicted remains subject to
criminal punishment according to law.64
D. Judicial Independence
One of the core values of our democracy is judicial independence.65
“It is based upon the principal that each case should be decided on its
particular facts and applicable law rather than in response to political
considerations or public opinion.”66 The Founding Fathers and the
Framers adopted the theory of an independent judiciary during the
conception and ratification of the U.S. Constitution.67 Article III of the
U.S. Constitution is the crux of judicial independence and provides that
federal judges may be appointed for life terms and that the legislative
and executive branches may not combine to punish judges.68
Alexander Hamilton, a Framer of the U.S. Constitution, offered
justification for an independent judiciary in the 78th paper of “The
Federalist.”69 Hamilton argued that “there is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”70
Further, he explained that “[t]he complete independence of the courts of
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”71 By this,
Hamilton meant that only an independent judicial branch of government
would be able to impartially check an excessive exercise of power by the
other branches of government.72 Thus, the judiciary would guard the
rule of law in a constitutional democracy.73
E. Arguments Regarding the Recall of Judge Aaron Persky
In California, the recall petition for Judge Aaron Persky has sparked
a fierce debate regarding the recall’s effects on California’s independent
judiciary. Additionally, Nevada and Utah’s approach to judicial recall
will be discussed in contrast to California’s to support the position that

64. Id.
65. SUP. CT. OF CAL. CTY. OF SANTA CLARA RETIRED JUDICIAL OFFICERS, Open Letter
on the Need for Judicial Independence, http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca/SCC-Retired-JudgesOpen-Letter.pdf.
66. Id.
67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall
hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. III.
69. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. John Patrick, Judicial Independence, ANNENBERG CLASSROOM,
http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/term/judicial-independence.
73. Id.
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the recall mechanism is unnecessary and threatens to abrogate the
independence of the judiciary.74
1. Arguments Opposing Judicial Recall
Opponents of the recall assert that judicial independence is a
cornerstone of due process and an essential prerequisite of a fair criminal
justice system.75 “Judges are entrusted with immense power over the
life and liberty of criminal defendants from all walks of life, and they
need latitude to exercise that power judiciously.”76 Moreover, judicial
recalls over a single lawful judicial ruling threaten our independent
judiciary and set a dangerous precedent.77 The rationale behind this is
that “historically and empirically, recall actions push judges towards
sharply ratcheting up sentences, especially against the poor and people
of color, out of fear of media campaigns run by well-funded interest
groups.”78 Through use of the recall mechanism, we risk repeating an
ugly chapter of California’s history: when three California Supreme
Court Justices were recalled for voting in opposition to the death
penalty, despite casting their votes “in accordance with the dictates of
justice and the constitution as they understood them.”79 In sum, “judges
must be able to make decisions without fear of political repercussions.”80
Showing judicial mercy by granting a “second chance to criminal
defendants is a delicate decision that requires courage on part of the
judges.”81 The CJP investigated the allegations against Judge Persky and
rejected the claims of bias, finding that he followed the law and the Santa
Clara County Probation Department’s recommendation.82
A “proper sentence that punishes and rehabilitates is not something
that should be subject to popular vote.”83 As stated by Judge LaDoris
Cordell, “[s]hould the recall succeed, the independence of the California
74. See infra Section II.E.3.
75. Open Letter on the Need for Judicial Independence, supra note 65.
76. Stanford Law School Graduates Submit Letter to Reconsider Recall Effort of Judge
Persky, A.C. JUST. PROJECT, https://acjusticeproject.org/2016/06/22/stanford-law-schoolgraduates-submit-letter-to-reconsider-recall-effort-of-judge-persky/.
77. Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, supra note 3.
78. Law Professors’ Statement for the Independence of the Judiciary and Against the
Recall of Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 15,
2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/file/232/4/232489%20names%20Law%20Professors%20Statement.pdf.
79. Stanford Law School Graduates Submit Letter to Reconsider Recall Effort of Judge
Persky, supra note 76.
80. Open Letter on the Need for Judicial Independence, supra note 65.
81. Stanford Law School Graduates Submit Letter to Reconsider Recall Effort of Judge
Persky, supra note 76.
82. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner,
supra note 3.
83. Cordell, supra note 1.
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judiciary and the integrity of lawful, albeit sometimes unpopular rulings
by judges will be forever compromised.”84 “Judges must have the ability
to exercise their discretion, especially when it comes to sentencing.”85
The predominant fear is that if voter-initiated recalls based upon
unpopular rulings by judges become the precedent, judges will impose
mandatory sentences without consideration for a defendant’s individual
circumstances.86 To support their assertions, the opposition cites several
studies which indicate that the imposition of mandatory sentencing will
have a disproportionately large effect on the poor and people of color.87
All of these concerns highlight the need for an independent judiciary;
one that is unbiased and considers a defendant’s circumstances when
determining a sentence under the law, rather than predicating a sentence
upon the fear of being recalled.
2. Arguments Supporting Judicial Recall
Proponents of the recall propose that citizens must have the power
to directly police the judiciary, because judges “exercise political power,
and therefore, may act for corrupt and improper reasons.”88
Additionally, complaints sent to the CJP are subject to a biased,
erroneous proceeding, conducted by an agency that has a history of
protecting judges.89 Recall is a constant threat, which makes judges
continuously accountable for their actions.90 Holding judges accountable
through recall is a legitimate exercise of democratic accountability.91
Recall does not affect judicial independence, because it is simply an
early retention election.92 “In a retention election, voters may consider
information about a judge’s performance of his duties when casting their
ballots.”93 The recall is no different, as it is merely an alternative to a
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Emi Young & Akiva Freidlin, Race, Privilege, and Recall: Why the Misleading
Campaign Against the Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner Will Only Make Our System Less
Fair, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2016), https://medium.com/@recalljustice/race-privilege-andrecall-d0658c8d04ea.
88. Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: Top Ten Constitutional
Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 939 n.58 (2004)
(explaining the argument in support of including judges within recall statutes).
89. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner,
supra note 3.
90. Id.
91. Tracey Kaplan, Opponents of Recalling Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky Stress
Judicial
Independence,
MERCURY
NEWS
(Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/12/opponents-of-recalling-judge-stress-judicialindependence/.
92. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner,
supra note 3.
93. Id.
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traditional election.94 It is up to the voters to determine whether or not
the judge continues in office and the voters may consider the judge’s
history on the bench, including his decisions, in making their
determinations.95
Further, because the judiciary was created to serve the public, the
people should have the right to remove members who fail to carry out
their duties.96 Thus, the retention election and the recall are similar
devices which permit the public to decide whether to remove a judge
from the bench.97
Finally, because it is the citizen’s right to initiate a recall, it follows,
then, that it is the electorate that should determine the merit of that reason
as grounds for removal, not the court.98 Through this process, the reason
behind voters initiating the recall “presents a political issue for resolution
by vote, and not a legal question for court decision.”99 The process
grants citizens direct participation in policing the judiciary and provides
a tool to attain equal justice.100
3. Judicial Recall in Other States
Recently, Nevada voters accused a municipal court judge of
injudicious conduct and initiated a recall petition for her removal from
office.101 Seeking an injunction, the judge sued, arguing that judges are
not subject to recall under the Nevada Constitution.102 Nevada’s
Supreme Court held that citizens may elect judges, but they may not
recall them from office.103
The Nevada voters approved the creation of the Commission on
Judicial Discipline (CJD) “through a constitutional amendment to
provide for a standardized system of judicial governance.”104 The
“amendment provides for the removal of judges from office as a form of
94. Recall Aaron Persky (FAQ),
https://web.archive.org/web/20171231032027/http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/factsheet
(last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
95. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner,
supra note 3.
96. Ramsey v. City of North Las Vegas, 392 P.3d 614, 624 (2017) (Pickering J., Douglas
J. dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 627.
99. Id.
100. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner,
supra note 3.
101. Steve Sebelius, Nevada Supreme Court rules Silver State Judges Can’t Be Recalled
From Office, L.V. REV. J., https://www.reviewjournal.com/steve-sebelius/nevada-supremecourt-rules-silver-state-judges-cant-be-recalled-from-office/.
102. Id.
103. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 622.
104. Id. at 615-16.
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discipline.”105 The argument posed to the court was that even if judges
originally could be recalled, the creation of the CJD repealed any such
prior recall authority vested in citizens over judges.106
The court began by analyzing the Legislature’s intent for creating
the CJD.107 Intending to promote an independent judiciary, the
Legislature believed that the CJD would be in a better position than
voters to evaluate the performance of a judge and recommend corrective
action.108
The court analyzed the language contained within the constitutional
provision and held that the omission of an express intent to maintain the
citizen’s recall power over judges was evidence of the Legislature’s
intent to supplant other forms of judicial removal, except legislative
impeachment.109 Further, permitting voters to recall judges because of
an unpopular decision, and not because of incompetence, subjects judges
to political influence when rendering their decisions.110
Finally, the court held that judges were not subject to recall because
of: (1) the legislative history, (2) the order in which the constitutional
provisions were enacted, and (3) the importance of insulating the judicial
branch from political influences; a prerogative that cannot be
accomplished if voter recall of judges is interpreted to have not been
repealed by the creation of the CJD.111
Similarly, Utah’s constitution does not provide citizens with the
power to remove judges through recall.112 Like Nevada, Utah limits its
methods of removing judges to retention elections, legislative
impeachment, or removal recommendations by the Judicial Conduct
Commission (JCC) to the Utah Supreme Court.113 Moreover, because
citizens submit complaints for the JCC to investigate, they have a direct
role in policing the judiciary.114 Utah has yet to determine whether these
methods of policing judges are inadequate, 115 thereby lending credence
to the notion that despite opinions to the contrary, the ability to recall
judges is not an essential political devise.
105. Id. at 616.
106. Id. at 617.
107. Id. at 618.
108. Id.
109. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 619-22.
110. Id. at 624.
111. Id. at 622.
112. Timothy Pack, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Removing Public Officials from
Office in Utah and the Case for Recall, UTAH L. REV. 665, 665 (2008).
113. Id. at 667-68. The JCC may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or
involuntary retirement of any justice or judge, however, before implementing any JCC order,
the Utah Supreme Court will review the JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact.
114. Id. at 669.
115. Id. at 665.
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III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The California Constitution’s citizens recall provision is an
insufficient mechanism to police the judiciary.116 Currently, the
constitution contains no provision stating grounds for which judges may
be removed.117 This language is overbroad because it gives citizens the
power to recall a judge who makes one lawful, albeit unpopular
decision.118 Surely this is not what the Legislature had intended when
granting citizens the power to recall judges.
Further, subjecting judges to recall entangles politics with
California’s independent judiciary.119
Empirical studies have
demonstrated that judges who are subject to being voted out of office
allow political pressure to influence their sentencing decisions.120
Judges’ ability to remain impartial is nullified if they have to test the
winds in fear of igniting public outrage before rendering a decision.121
Finally, the evidence suggests that this overbroad power not only
abolishes an independent judiciary, but also results in harsher sentencing
for the poor and people of color.122 The critical issue set forth is that the
current California constitutional provision subjecting judges to citizen
recall threatens to abolish the independence of the judiciary, and is
therefore an insufficient mechanism to police judges.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. California’s Commission on Judicial Performance Explanatory
Statement
Although proponents of judicial recall contend that the CJP is
corrupt and biased in favor of judges,123 the process in which it
investigates allegations of misconduct is quite complex and impartial.124
In the Turner case, Judge Aaron Persky sentenced Brock Turner to “six
months in county jail plus three years of probation and lifetime sex
116. See generally Cordell, supra note 1.
117. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a).
118. Cordell, supra note 1.
119. Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner, supra note 3.
120. Kate Berry, How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST.,
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/How_Judicial_Elections_Impa
ct_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
121. Cordell, supra note 1.
122. Young & Freidlin, supra note 87.
123. See generally Voters Recall Aaron Persky, Judge Who Sentenced Brock Turner,
supra note 3.
124. See generally Comm’n on Jud. Performance, Commission On Judicial Performance
Closes Investigation of Judge Aaron Persky, C.A. GOV’T, https://cjp.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/Persky_Explanatory_Statement_12-19-16.pdf.
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offender registration.”125 The sentencing decision was widely criticized
as being too lenient, and triggered significant media coverage and public
outrage.126 In response to the outrage, the CJP issued an explanatory
statement pursuant to the California Constitution.127
The complaints submitted to the CJP primarily “alleged that:
(1) Judge Persky abused his authority and displayed bias in his
sentencing of Turner;
(2) the sentence was unlawful;
(3) the judge displayed gender bias and failed to take sexual assault
of women seriously;
(4) the judge exhibited racial and/or socioeconomic bias because a
non-white or less privileged defendant would have received a
harsher sentence; and
(5) the judge’s history as a student-athlete at Stanford University
caused him to be biased in favor of Turner and that he should have
disclosed his Stanford affiliation or disqualified himself from
handling the case.”128

Regarding the unlawful sentencing complaint, the CJP determined
that the sentence was within the parameters set by the Penal Code,129 and
was therefore lawful.130 The transcript of the Turner sentencing hearing
reflects the judge’s finding that “Turner’s youth and lack of a significant
record reduced his culpability, thereby overcoming the statutory
limitation on probation.”131 The transcript also reflects the judge’s
consideration of the factors that the rules require a court to consider to
determine whether probation is appropriate instead of a state prison
sentence.132
125. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, Commission On Judicial Performance
Closes
Investigation
of
Judge
Aaron
Persky,
https://cjp.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/Persky_Explanatory_Statement_12-19-16.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Id. The CJP’s statement was made pursuant to CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(k).
128. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125.
129. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.065(b) (“Except in unusual cases where the interests of
justice would best be served if the person is granted probation, probation shall not be granted
to a person who violates various other subsections relating to sexual offenses or is convicted
of assault with intent to commit a specified sexual offense.”).
130. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125.
131. Id.
132. Id. (“Factors include: the nature; seriousness; and circumstances of the crime as
compared to other instances of the same crime; the vulnerability of the victim; whether the
defendant inflicted physical or emotional injury; whether the defendant was an active
participant in the crime; whether the defendant demonstrated criminal sophistication; the
defendant’s prior criminal record; the defendant’s willingness and ability to comply with the
terms of probation; the likely effect of imprisonment on the defendant; the adverse collateral
consequences on the defendant from the felony conviction; whether the defendant is
remorseful; and whether or not the defendant was likely be a danger to others.”).
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Next, the CJP addressed an additional complaint that the judge’s
sentencing decision, based in part on Turner’s youth, level of
intoxication, and remorse, constituted judicial bias, and thus, an abuse of
his discretion.133 The CJP determined that “[e]ven if it were improper
for the judge to assess those factors as he did, those issues are properly
addressed on appeal.”134 Under the Code of Judicial Ethics, “[a] judicial
decision or administrative act later determined to be incorrect legally is
not itself a violation of this code.”135 Further, under the standard set by
the California Supreme Court, even if the judge failed to follow a statute
or abused his discretion, the CJP cannot impose discipline unless the
error “clearly and convincingly reflect[ed] bad faith, bias, abuse of
authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of the
law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty.”136
“The presence or absence of judicial bias has been established in
some cases by examining whether a judge’s remarks or conduct reflected
bias.”137 “Bias has also been assessed in some instances by examining
decisions in other similar cases.”138
“A judge’s comments during sentencing are one type of in court
statement that commissions and courts are hesitant to subject to
discipline; a reluctance based on concern that sanctions would
discourage judges from articulating the bases for their sentencing
decisions.”139 Regarding Judge Persky’s remarks during the sentencing
hearing, when granting probation for certain sex offenses under the Penal
Code,140 judges must explain on the record why granting probation
would be in the interests of justice.141 This can be demonstrated through
an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the case.142 Moreover,
judges must also state the primary factor(s) that support their decision to
grant probation.143
One complainant contended that “the judge’s remark at the Turner
sentencing hearing that Turner ‘will not be a danger to others’ reflected

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. CAL. JUD. ETHICS CODE, Cannon 1.
136. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125 (quoting Oberholzer v.
Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 20 Cal. 4th 371, 395-99 (1999)).
137. Id. (quoting In re Glickfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 891 (1971)).
138. Id. (quoting In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 2014)).
139. Id. at n.5 (quoting Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct:
Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245 (2004)).
140. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.065(b).
141. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 7 (citing CAL. RULES OF
COURT, R. 4.406).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 4.406(b)).
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bias.”144 However, as the CJP’s statement noted “future dangerousness
is one of the factors that a judge must consider when deciding whether
to grant or deny probation.”145 Further, the remark derived from the
results of two clinical tests, contained within the probation report, which
predicted whether Turner would be dangerous in the future.146
Another complainant contended that Judge Persky’s remark
regarding the severe impact a prison sentence would have on Turner
reflected his bias. 147 However, in determining whether probation is
appropriate, “the likely impact of imprisonment on the defendant” is a
relevant factor to which the judge must consider.148
Finally, the allegation that Judge Persky abused his discretion by
engaging in judicial bias is unsupported by the transcript from the
sentencing hearing, as there was no evidence that Turner’s race,
socioeconomic status, university affiliation, or student athlete status
were implicitly referenced when Judge Persky made his remarks.149 Nor
did the transcript support the notion that Judge Persky considered the
victim’s damages in a subjective manner or that he lacked sympathy for
her.150
In sum, the CJP concluded that neither judge Persky’s statements
regarding Turner, nor any other remarks made by him during the
sentencing hearing constituted clear and convincing evidence of judicial
bias.151
The Commission also provided examples of cases where it found
judges statements to reflect bias, in stark contrast to the instant case.152

144. Id.
145. Id. (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 4.414(b)(8)).
146. Id. (“The probation department evaluated Turner’s dangerousness using two
assessment tools and advised in its report that he was not very likely to re-offend due to
receiving a score of 3 on the Static-99R, an actuarial measure of sexual offense recidivism,
which placed him in the low-moderate risk category for being charged or convicted of another
sexual offense; further the Probation Department validated the previous finding by assessing
Turner using the Corrections Assessment Intervention System, a standardized, validated
assessment and case management system developed by the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency which assesses a defendant’s criminogenic needs and risk to re-offend.”).
147. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 7.
148. Id. (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 4.414(b)(5)). Judge Persky “acknowledged that
state prison is likely to have a severe impact on a defendant ‘in any case,’ and, he explained,
‘I think it’s probably more true with a youthful offender sentenced to state prison at a young
age.’ ” Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Judge Persky acknowledged that with respect to the vulnerability of the victim,
the victim in this case was extremely vulnerable. Further, he acknowledged that it was an
element of counts two and three of the crime Turner was charged with, but not count one.
Finally, Judge Persky explained that the element obviously weighed in favor of denying
probation. Id. at 4.
151. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 7.
152. Id.
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In People v. Beasley,153 the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court’s order of probation and dismissal of various rape, robbery, and
kidnapping charges.154 “In open court, the judge referred to the victim
as the ‘alleged victim’ and ridiculed the police inspector who
accompanied her to the defendants’ probation hearing and his superior
officer who had instructed the inspector to accompany the victim to
court.”155 The court found that the judge’s “incomprehensible tirade”
constituted judicial bias against the victim and the accompanying
officers.156 The California Supreme Court censured the judge one year
after the Beasley case was decided.157
The Commission’s
recommendation for discipline was based on the remarks referred to in
the appellate decision, the judge insulting the victim, and his intemperate
remarks in open court.158
More recently, in 2012, the Commission publicly admonished a
judge for making remarks at a sentencing hearing in a rape case that
created the impression that he was biased against victims who did not
suffer serious bodily injury demonstrating a struggle.159
Other criminal cases handled by Judge Persky have also been
pointed out “as proof of his bias in favor of white and/or privileged male
defendants, particularly college athletes, and/or of his failure to take
violence against women seriously.”160 The explanatory statement of the
investigation references each of these cases and explains why the
sentencing determinations were lawful.161
In People v. Ramirez, Ramirez sexually assaulted his female
roommate.162 In a negotiated deal through counsel, Ramirez received a
three-year sentence163 in exchange for a guilty plea. There are some
allegations, based upon a comparison between Ramirez’s sentence and
Turner’s lighter sentence, which contend that Ramirez’s Salvadorian
heritage was the explanation for the disparity in sentencing decisions.164
153. Id. (citing People v. Beasley, 5 Cal. App. 3d 617 (1970)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 7-8.
156. Id. at 8.
157. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 8.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing Public Admonishment of Judge Johnson (2012)). In this instance, “the
judge relied on his own expert opinion, based on his experience as a prosecutor, saying, ‘I’m
not a gynecologist, but I can tell you something: If someone doesn’t want to have sexual
intercourse, the body shuts down. The body will not permit that to happen unless a lot of
damage is inflicted . . .’ The judge also said that the case ‘trivializes a rape,’ was ‘technical,’
and was ‘more of a crim law test than a real live criminal case.’ ”
160. Id. at 8.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 8.
164. Id.
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However, although Judge Persky presided over the case’s earlier
proceedings, a subsequent judge presided over Ramirez’ guilty plea.
“Thus, the Ramirez case cannot be used to demonstrate disparate
treatment in sentencing by Judge Persky.”165
In addition, Ramirez’s sentence resulted from negotiations
between counsel.166 Finally, the penalty for Ramirez’s plea—to the
crime of forcible sexual penetration of a conscious or unimpaired
person—is comprised of a three year state prison statutory mandatory
minimum sentence.167 “California law explicitly prohibits a downward
departure for a violation of that penal code section168 under any
circumstances, whereas the penal code sections Brock Turner was
convicted of violating169 permitted, at the time,170 a downward departure
to probation in certain circumstances.”171
Proponents of judicial recall have also pointed to Judge Persky’s
sentencing in People v. Chiang, People v. Gunderson, and People v.
Smith, each of which involved domestic battery charges, and People v.
Chain, as proof of his bias towards white or privileged defendants or
those who are college athletes, and as evidence that Judge Persky lacks
sympathy in cases involving violence against women.172
Although judges must review a probation report, the law does not
require them to follow its recommendations.173 One of the county
probation department’s primary duties is to assist the court in arriving at
an appropriate sentence.174 “Judge Persky’s sentencing decisions in the
165. Id.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Cal. Penal Code § 289(a) (“Any person who commits an act of sexual penetration
when the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.”).
168. Id.; Cal. Penal Code § 289(a).
169. Id.; Cal. Penal Code §§ 220(a)(1), 289(e), & 289(d).
170. Id.; See CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at n.1 (explaining
that on September 30, 2016, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law Assembly Bill 2888,
which amended Penal Code § 1203.065 to prohibit courts from granting probation instead of
a state prison sentence to anyone convicted of Penal Code § 289(d) or § 289(e)); see also
Jazmine Ulloa, Spurred by Brock Turner Case, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Law to Toughen
Against Rape, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-saccalifornia-sex-crimes-stanford-cosby-bills-20160930-snap-htmlstory.html
(describing
California’s expansion of mandatory minimum sentences for sex crime cases in greater
detail).
171. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 8.
172. Id. at 9. (citing People v. Chiang (No. B1475227); People v. Gunderson (No.
B1577341); People v. Smith (No. B1581137); People v. Chain (No. B1473538)).
173. Id. at 9; Cal. Penal Code § 1203(b)(3).
174. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 9 (quoting People v.
Villarreal, 65 Cal. App. 3d 938, 945 (1977)) (explaining it is fundamental that the probation
decision should not turn solely upon the nature of the offense committed, but should be rooted
in the facts and circumstances of each case).
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Chiang, Gunderson, and Smith cases resulted from negotiated
agreements between the defense and the prosecution.”175 “In three of the
four cases, the judge’s sentencing decisions aligned with the
recommendations of the probation department.”176 However, the fourth
case did not involve a probation report. 177
Thus, because Judge Persky followed all applicable rules, the CJP
determined that these decisions did not provide clear and convincing
evidence to support the contention that his decisions reflected personal
bias in favor of white criminal defendants and/or more privileged
criminal defendants, nor that he took crimes involving violence against
women less seriously.178
Finally, critics have remarked that Judge Persky should have
recused himself from the Turner case because he and Turner both
competed in athletics at Stanford University.179 They argue that at the
very least, the judge should be required to disclose his connection with
the university.180
The Code of Civil Procedure181 (CCP) articulates the circumstances
which require disqualification of a member of the judiciary.182 The CCP
“states that a judge shall be disqualified if [f]or any reason [a] person
aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge
would be able to be impartial.”183 The Code of Judicial Ethics “requires
judges to disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant
to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no
basis for disqualification.”184
The commission cited Cline v. Sawyer,185 as an example of a court
denying a party’s disqualification challenge to a judge, which was
premised upon the fact that the judge and the respondents attended the
same university.186 The court noted:
[t]he affidavit alleges that the judge and [respondents] attended the
same university at the same time where ‘they may have’ belonged to

175. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 9.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 10.
180. Id.
181. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 10; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 170.1.
182. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 10.
183. Id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).
184. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 10; CAL. JUD. ETHICS
CODE, Cannon 3E(2).
185. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 11 (quoting Cline v.
Sawyer, 600 P. 2d 725 (Wyo. 1979)).
186. Id.
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the same fraternities or associations. Certainly . . . [i]t does not
reflect a leaning of his mind in favor of [respondents] to the extent
that it will sway his judgment or to the extent that he would make his
decisions in the matter other than on the evidence placed before
him.187

The CJP concluded that Judge Persky’s connections to Stanford
University were not of the kind to which disclosure or recusal would
have been required under the law.188 Further, the ties were insufficient
to establish his alleged failure to act impartially, in favor of Turner or
other Stanford-affiliated litigants.189
In sum, “[a]n independent, impartial, and honorable judiciary is
indispensable to justice in our society.”190 “An independent judge is one
who is able to rule as he or she determines appropriate, without fear of
jeopardy or punishment.”191 “So long as the judge makes rulings in good
faith, and in an effort to follow the law as the judge understands it, the
usual safeguard against error or overreaching lies in the adversary
system and appellate review.”192 The CJP concluded by stating it did not
find clear and convincing evidence of injudicious conduct by Judge
Persky.193
Although there are allegations of the CJP being biased in favor of
protecting judges,194 its explanatory statement regarding the procedural
process through which it analyzed the complaints against Judge Persky
highlights its impartiality. All conclusions contained in the statement
are supported by law and distinguish judicious conduct from injudicious
conduct. Moreover, “since 2005, the CJP has removed six judges for
misconduct.”195 Thus, the explanatory statement demonstrates that the
CJP is an adequate mechanism to allow citizens to participate in the
political process and police the judiciary, without the need for subjecting
judges recall. Other states have created commissions similar to the CJP
to eliminate political pressures from influencing judges’ decisions,
thereby, preserving their ability to remain impartial and maintaining the
independence of the judiciary.196
187. Id.
188. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 11.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Cannon 1 of the California Code of Judicial Ethics).
191. Id.
192. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, supra note 125, at 12.
193. Id.
194. See generally Recall Aaron Persky (FAQ), (last visited Mar. 21, 2019)
https://web.archive.org/web/20171231032027/http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/factsheet
195. LaDoris Cordell, Cordell: Do Not Recall Persky Over Brock Turner-Stanford Case,
MERCURY NEWS (June 23, 2016), https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/23/cordell-donot-recall-persky-over-brock-turner-stanford-case/.
196. See infra Section IV.B.
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B. Analysis of Judicial Recall in Other States
In Ramsey v. North Las Vegas, the Supreme Court of Nevada
rendered its decision based upon statutory interpretation.197 Recognizing
that judges were public officers and subject to recall under an existing
constitutional provision,198 the court looked to the language of the newer
enactment to determine whether it gave the CJD exclusive authority to
remove judges.199 If so, the previous provision would be abrogated.200
Looking at the specific language contained within the statute
creating the CJD, the court noted that the inclusion of impeachment and
removal by the CJD were exclusive methods to remove a judge, thereby
excluding recall.201 In its holding, the court relied on the theory of
statutory interpretation that states the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another,202 and thus, the methods provided in the new
enactment were exclusive and repealed any existing statutes reserving
the power of recall to Nevada citizens.203
In addition, the court explained that “[w]hereas the Commission’s
purpose is to be consistent, public opinion rarely is; instead, conduct that
may yield a recall in one district may not do the same in another.”204 The
court continued, explaining “[t]he dissent correctly points out that recall
is unique because it allows voters to initiate removal for cause they alone
decide.205 Such a result is precisely what the creation of the Commission
was intended to avoid.”206 Like Nevada, Utah does not allow citizens to
recall judges.207 Its Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the JCC is
an adequate mechanism to participate police the judiciary.208
Thus, Nevada, Utah, and many other states209 have refrained from
subjecting judges to recall, recognizing the chilling effect it has on
197. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 622.
198. NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 9 (providing in relevant part, every public officer in the State
of Nevada is subject to recall from office by the registered voters of the state, or of the county,
district, or municipality which he represents).
199. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 619.
200. Id.
201. NEV. CONST. art. 6, §§ 19-21 (providing in relevant part, a justice of the Supreme
Court, a district judge, a justice of the peace or a municipal judge may, in addition to the
provision of Article 7 for impeachment, be censured, retired, removed or otherwise disciplined
by the commission on judicial discipline).
202. Although California is not able to use such statutory interpretation, the Nevada court
used the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning the expressing of one thing is
the exclusion of another, to interpret the statute creating the CJD.
203. Ramsey, 392 P.3d at 622.
204. Id. at 621.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Pack, supra note 112, at 665.
208. Id.
209. See Recall of State Officials, supra note 18 (explaining that only eight states permit
judicial recall: Arizona, California, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin permit judicial
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judicial independence. Additionally, several in-depth studies analyze
the effects of political pressures on judges’ sentencing decisions in
criminal cases, thereby supporting the notion that an independent
judiciary is necessary for creating equality when sentencing criminal
defendants.210
C. Empirical Studies Reveal That Political Pressures Impact Judges’
Sentencing Decisions to the Detriment of Criminal Defendants
“Given the extraordinary power state court judges exercise over the
liberty, and the lives, of defendants, it is vital that they remain
impartial.”211 However, increasing amounts of evidence suggest that
providing citizens with the ability to recall judges based upon lawful,
albeit unpopular decisions jeopardizes judges’ ability to remain
impartial in criminal cases.212
Ten prominent empirical studies examining the relationship
between judicial elections and criminal case outcomes all found that
political pressures impact judges’ rulings to the detriment of criminal
defendants.213 The studies found that the threat of recall causes judges
to (1) sentence more punitively and (2) vote less frequently in favor of
criminal defendants on appeal.214
The data reveals that advertisements and other media describing a
judge’s record on criminal history, has an effect on retention elections
and on judges’ sentencing decisions.215 For example, a Pennsylvania
study examining whether retention elections had an effect on judges
analyzed over 22,000 sentences for aggravated assault, rape, and robbery
in the 1990s.216 Researchers found that “sentences for these crimes are
significantly longer the closer the sentencing judge is to standing for
reelection.”217 Additional research, based upon the crimes analyzed,
indicated “more than 2,000 years of additional incarceration could be
recall based upon any grounds, while Georgia, Minnesota, and Montana require grounds such
as malfeasance, misconduct, failure to perform duties of the office, or conviction of a serious
crime while in office to support a petition for judicial recall).
210. See infra Section IV.C.
211. How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, supra note 120, at 1.
212. See id. at 1.
213. Id. at 1.
214. Id. at 2.
215. Id. at 1 (“To assess the role of criminal cases in judicial elections, this paper considers
15 years of television advertising data for state supreme court elections, provided by
CMAG/Kantar Media and analyzed by the Brennan Center for Justice, as well as a series of
reports synthesizing this data written by the Brennan Center, Justice at Stake, and the National
Institute on Money in State Politics.”).
216. How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, supra note 120, at 7. Researchers
selected “this class of offense because judges sentencing in these cases always exercise some
discretion in determining the severity of the punishment and typically assign prison time.”
217. Id.
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attributed to re-election pressures” and fear of being seen as soft on
crime.218
Moreover, a separate study made similar findings about the impact
of re-election pressures and its effect on sentencing in Washington
State.219 Every four years, Washington’s trial court judges stand for reelection.220 The researchers relied on a dataset of 276,119 cases, which
were heard by 265 judges in the state from 1995 to 2006. 221 The dataset
revealed that sentences were ten percent longer when the judge’s
political cycle neared an end; as opposed to sentences made during the
beginning of the judge’s political cycle.222 Their study focused on
assault, murder, rape, and robbery cases.223 In concluding that the
increased sentences were a direct result of re-election pressure, the
researchers determined that they could:
rule out patterns in cyclical sentencing due to factors other than
politics . . . by examining sentencing by retiring judges, who do not
face electoral pressure; the sentencing of less serious crimes, about
which the public (and potential competitors for a judge’s seat) are
likely less concerned; and sentencing in nearby Oregon, where
judges are elected on a different cycle.224

Finally, a research study recording Kansas trial courts from 1997 to
2003 considered the effects of political pressures on judges’ sentencing
decisions.225 “They found that incumbent judges facing competitive reelection rendered more punitive sentences than judges seeking to keep
their seats through non-contested retention races.”226 The study analyzed
a dataset containing 18,139 felonies—focusing on assault, criminal
threat, robbery, sexual assault, theft, burglary, and arson—which
revealed that judges imposed longer sentences when faced with an

218. Id. at 8-9.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, supra note 120, at 7.
223. Id. at 8.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 9.
226. Id.; see also Misty Fritz, What is the Difference Between a Contested and an
Uncontested
Election?,
OTW
ELECTIONS
(Aug.
2,
2016),
http://elections.transformativeworks.org/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-a-contestedelection-and-an-uncontested-election/ (explaining that a “contested election occurs when
there are more candidates than there are available seats on the Board, and the voters choose
which ones will be elected”, whereas, an “uncontested election occurs when the number of
open seats on the Board is equal to or greater than the number of candidates,” thus, “each
candidate is technically unopposed and will automatically be elected to the Board following
the election process.”).
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upcoming retention election, as compared to the sentencing imposed by
judges with retention elections occurring at some time in the future.227
Based upon this analysis, the research indicates that there is strong
evidence to support the notion that judges’ behavior is affected by the
threat of a feasible challenger in a retention election.228 Moreover, the
evidence shows that judicial politics affects racial groups in a disparate
fashion.229 Incarceration rates rise disproportionately for black felons,
evidenced by a 2.2 to 2.6 percent increase during the election year;
whereas white felons do not experience such an increase in incarceration
rates.230 The evidence is parallel to a model that predicts that judges will
engage in discriminatory sentencing as a result of the electorate’s
preference for racially disparate sentencing.231 Using proxies of districtlevel prejudice, research indicates that “the increase in black
incarceration rates are 2 to 4.5 times larger in districts associated with
higher levels of predicted racial prejudice.”232 “These results speak
directly to the existing debate on the merits of judicial accountability
versus independence.”233 “While judicial elections increase policy
congruence, policy congruence seems less palatable when the
electorate’s ideal policy undermine fundamental democratic
principles.”234
In sum, these empirical studies conclude that judges’ sentencing
decisions are affected by political pressures. This supports the notion
that recall has a chilling effect on an independent judiciary. Judges
should not conform to the will of the majority in fear of losing their
position on the bench; which ultimately effects their ability to act
impartially.235 Thus, because the exercise of judicial discretion is
critical, “especially when it comes to sentencing, without discretion, we
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are left with cookie cutter justice that imposes mandatory sentences
without any regard to defendants’ circumstances.”236 The effects are far
more damaging than the occasional ill-advised sentence.237 Mandatory
sentencing has accomplished nothing, aside from mass incarceration of
the poor and people of color.238
The underlying logic of creating a CJP and similar commissions
was to police the judiciary and to address citizens’ complaints pertaining
to judge’s injudicious conduct.239 As exemplified by other states’
exclusion of trial court judges from recall, the findings from the
empirical studies, and the CJP’s explanatory statement in the Persky
investigation, recall is not an effective mechanism to police judges, and
thus, should be eliminated from the California Constitution.
V. PROPOSAL
Subjecting trial court judges to recall will have an adverse effect on
the criminal justice system, and the justice system generally. The
California Legislature should amend the California Constitution by
removing trial court judges from the list of local officials subject to
recall. Without an independent judiciary, judges will lose their
discretion, thus bending towards the will of the majority when making
sentencing decisions. This practice results in the abolition of merciful
sentencing, the implementation of mandatory minimums, and longer
sentencing so as to appear tough on crime in order to remain in office.240
Throughout history, these practices have primarily had a debilitating
effect on the poor and people of color.241
Removing a judge from office will not prevent crimes such as the
sexual assault committed by Brock Turner. Proponents of judicial recall
somehow believe that by removing a judge, the criminal justice system
will be restored and power will remain with the people.242 However, this
is a fallacy. History and empirical evidence indicate that we have never
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had an equal criminal justice system.243 If judges lose their ability to
remain impartial, courts will become extensions of the media, sentencing
based upon public outrage rather than aggregating the totality of the
circumstances and rendering a proper sentence under the law.244
Abolishing California’s independent judiciary will nullify all progress
that we have made towards reforming the criminal justice system.
Further, commissions such as the CJP provide citizens with the
ability and opportunity to police the judiciary. The Legislature
intentionally included citizens who are not and were never part of the
legal field as members of the CJP, so as to safeguard against bias and
preserve impartiality during investigations.245 Retention elections also
serve as a tool for citizens to police the judiciary, because a judge who
performs unsatisfactorily may be replaced at the end of his or her term
in office. Finally, impeachment is an adequate mechanism to police the
judiciary, because an investigation is initiated when a judge is alleged to
have committed a crime enumerated within the impeachment statute.
Although an initiative is one option to resolve this problem, it is
impracticable because of its high cost and the difficulty in messaging.246
The implementation of my proposal is not substantially difficult.
Because the California Legislature possesses the power to amend the
constitution, I believe that it should amend the provision that expressly
lists judges as local officials who are subject to recall. Although
Nevada’s constitutional provision creating the CJD sets out the only
means by which judges may be removed, it is ambiguous and may be
overturned in the future depending on the courts statutory analysis.
California can avoid this pitfall and avoid any ambiguity by expressly
stating that trial court judges are not subject to recall. An example of the
provision may look as such: A petition to recall a statewide officer must
be signed by electors equal in number to twelve percent of the last vote
for the office, with signatures from each of five counties equal in number
to one percent of the last vote for the office in the county. Signatures to
recall senators, members of the Assembly, members of the Board of
Equalization; excluding judges of the supreme court, courts of appeal,
and trial courts, must equal in number twenty percent of the last vote for
the office.247
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VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the current mechanisms for policing judges are sufficient
and eliminate the need for citizen recall. State constitutions that do not
possess provisions which allow the recall of judges have not shown the
substantial deviation from justice that proponents of judicial recall claim
will stem from abolishing this right. Thus, the evidence demonstrates
that the only outcome of leaving judicial recall intact is the abolishment
of judicial independence and the nullification of all progress made by
criminal justice system reformists. Essentially, in regard to attaining an
equal criminal justice system, proponents may win the fight at the
detriment of losing the war.

